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Article 7

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

COMMENTS
DELEGATION

OF POWER TO ABOLISH OFFICE

OF COUNTY TREASURER-The North Carolina

Constitution, in Art. VII, makes provision
for a system of local government. Sec. 14
of that article provides that "the General
Assembly shall have full power by statute
to modify, change, or abrogate any and all
of the provisions of this article, except
sections seven, nine and thirteen." Those
three sections are not involved in this discussion. In C. S. sec. 1389, the General
Assembly authorized the boards of commissioners of several counties, in their discretion,
to abolish the office of county treasurer, and
to appoint a bank or banks to perform the
duties of the office. The office of county
treasurer was established by Art. VII, sec.
1, of the Constitution of 1868. Upon a
mandamus proceeding to compel a county
treasurer whose office had been thus abolished, to pay over the funds in his possession
to the appointee bank, it was objected that
the statute was unconstitutional as an unwarranted delegation of legislative power. Held,
the statute is valid. Tyrrell County v. Holloway, 182 N. C. 64, 108 S. E. 377 (1921).
The original Constitution of 1868 did not
contain the section under consideration. That
was added by an amendment of 1875, for
the purpose of giving flexibility to a local
government system which had been found
unsatisfactory. As an original question, the
section might be thoughtp to have a double
significance. It apparently operates as a
grant to the legislature of a measure of control over local government organization that
it did not have under the Constitution. of 1868.
It is also conceivable that the section constituted a third method of amending the state
constitution. If this should be so, both of
these attributes would attach whenever the
legislature acted. The question, therefore,
whether the General Assembly can give to a
local government agency the power, in its
discretion, to abolish a part of the constitutional plan for the fiscal management of a
county, could be said to involve not only
the usual problem of the delegation of legislative power to a municipal corporation,
but also the unique problem of the delegation of power to change the state constitution.
That a wide discretionary power of local
self government may be vested in municipal
subdivisions of the state, without infringe-

ment upon the familiar rule that the substance of legislative power cannot be delegated, is well settled. See Thompson v.
Floyd, 47 N. C. 313 (1855); Manly v.
Raleigh, 57 N. C. 370, 377 (1859) ; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141 (1888). The
explanation -is historical. This was the
principal ground for the decision in the instant case.
The other question raised by the case, and
which the Court did not discuss, is more
difficult. Two views are possible. One is
that at least until the legislature acted under
sec. 14, all of the other thirteen sections were
parts of the state constitution. Originally,
and at least until 1875, they constituted a
major portion of the text of one article of
that instrument. Nor were they removed
from the text in that year. Rather the
sovereign people, who alone could take that
action, made the legislature their agent to
alter the content and significance of the sections. But the mere creation of an agency
does not ipso facto accomplish the desired
purpose, however clearly that may be authorized. The people had provided in the Constitution of 1868 for the amendment and
revision of the state constitution by means,
first, of a constitutional convention, and,
second, by the legislative submission of particular amendments. See N. C. Const., Art.
XIII, see. 1, 2. Did they in adopting this
section, authorize the legislature to exercise
a third and less cumbersome method of
amending one article of the Constitution?
There is, or rather, originally would have
been, some basis for that view. Moreover,
such a power, if actually granted, would not
be in the same category with the usual power
to regulate county government. Constitutional revision is a more important and significant matter. Apparently the people desired the judgment of the legislature itself
on the alterations, for the provision reads:
"the General Assembli shall have full power
by statute to," etc. It is, therefore, extremely doubtful whether section 14, under
this view, could be said to contemplate the
re-grant to a local government agency, of a
power so intimately related to sovereignty.
See In re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 27 Pac.
1064 (1891).
The other view, and this has been the consistent attitude of the Supreme Court of
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North Carolina, is that, by adopting section
14, the people reduced the other sections of
Art. VII, except seven, nine and thirteen, to
mere statutory provisions, and destroyed their
status as parts of the basic law. In other
words, the legislature was given an almost
complete control, to be exercised in the manner of ordinary legislation, over local government organization. Moreover, whatever may
have been the status of the constitutional
provisions in question between the date of
the adoption of the amendment in 1875 and
the date of the first legislative enactments
concerning their abrogation, it is entirely
probable today that as a result of nearly half
a century of legislative modification, they, and
the offices and institutions dealt with by them
have become entirely subject to all of the
characteristics of legislative action. See
Rhodes v. Hampton, 101 N. C. 630, 8 S. E.
219 (1888); Harriss v. Wright, 121 N. C.
172, 28 S. E. 269 (1897). It follows, of
course, from this premise, that this power
may, under the doctrine enunciated above, be
delegated to local government agencies.
B. B. L.

"Fair competition is the essence of an auction sale," Smith v. Greenlee, 13 N. C. 126,
18 Am. Dec. 564 (1830). It is definitely settled law that by-bidding or "puffing" of bids
at an auction is illegal. 3 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law, 2nd ed., 505-6; Veazie v. Williants,
8 How. (U. S.) 134 (1850); Bexwell v.
Christie, (1776 K. B.) Cowp. 395. The
weight of authority in North Carolina is in
accord with the general doctrine that such a
practice is violative of a public policy in favor
of open and competitive bidding at auction
sales. Morehead v. Hunt, 16 N. C. 35 (1826) ;
Davis v. Keen, 142 N. C. 496, 55 S. E. 359
(1906). The Court recognized this status of
the law in the principal case. It thought the
agreement "close akin to by-bidding which is
violative of the implied guaranty that all bids
at public sales are genuine." 6 C. J. 833;
McMillan v. Harris,110 Ga. 72, 35 S. E. 334
(1900); Nash v. Hospital Co., 180 N. C. 59
104 S. E. 33 (1920). The Court felt, however, that the agreement was valid because the
rights of third persons did not intervene, and
because the purpose and tendency of the act
was actually to increase bids at the sale. The
observations regarding by-bidding and the
AGREEMENTS
FOR
FiCTITIOus AUCTION
validity of the contract being by way of
BIDs-Plaintiff had been a bona fide bidder at obiter dicta, the Court based its decision on
a partition sale of land. The highest bid on the plaintiff's breach of contract-that by sellthe first sale was $10,250. On the last day for ing his bid to prevent a higher bid, he had
making an increased bid, defendant, whose defeated the purpose of the agreement.
minor son owned part of the land, agreed with
"It seems that a better ground for the deplaintiff that if plaintiff would raise the bid cision would have been the illegality of the
to $11,275, he (plaintiff) should receive a contract," because "the plaintiff was not prostipulated share of the increased bids over that hibited by his contract from making such a
amount; that in the event plaintiff should be sale, nor was the aim of the contract expressly
the highest bidder and have to take the prop- stated to be for the purpose of selling to the
erty, he would have to pay only $11,275 for highest bidder." 31 Yale L. J. 434. Was-"the
it. Plaintiff raised the bid to $11,275. A few contract valid? Its effect and express purpose
days later this arrangement was rescinded and was to create a false appearance of competitive
a new agreement was made whereby plaintiff bidding. The bona fide bidders at the sale
was to have "one half of the raised bids from knew nothing of the plaintiff's agreement
his present bid of $11,275 up to $12,075, and with the defendant. Plaintiff's presence
one third of the raise of bids from $12,075 among the bidders implied that he was a
up to the highest bid at the sale to be made bona fide bidder; that if he were the highest
.... 17 November, 1919 .... This agreement bidder, he would pay exactly what he pub... . is to be kept strictly confidential ....
licly and in their presence bid. But no matso as to protect (plaintiff) in his future bids ter how high thE plaintiff should bid-even
at the sale." At that' sale plaintiff was the though he should be the highest bidder and
last and highest bidder at $11,830. There- consequently be compelled to take the propafter plaintiff sold his bid to one Ferrell for erty-he would have to pay only $11,275 for
$650, without n6tice to defendant, in order to the land. "No bid, therefore, of his over
prevent Ferrell from increasing the bid. $11,275 could be considered bona fide;" every
Plaintiff sued for the stipulated share of the bid he made over the agreed price was "to
difference between his bid of $11,275 and the extent of the agreed share of remunera$11,830. Held, the plaintiff can not recover. tion fictitious." 31 Yale L. J. 434.
Jennings v. Jennings, 182 N. C. 26, 108 S. E.
On the other hand, if the property were
340 (1921).
knocked down to a higher bidder than the
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plaintiff, that bona fide bidder would have to
pay exactly what he bid, part of which would,
by the contract, be paid to -the plaintiff as
his commission for inflating the bids and
making the bidder pay the full price. In
Bexwell v. Christie, (1776 K. B.) Cowp. 395,
the leading English case on the subject of bybidding, is found the following statement:
"Suppose there was an agreement privately
with a particular person that if he was the
highest bidder, so much would be abated;
frequently abatements from the price fixed by
the vendor are made on a private sale and of

discharge any of the duties of his office. C.
S. sec. 4384. While performing a judicial
function within his jurisdiction, however, a
justice is not usually civilly liable for such
misconduct, even though he is actuated by corrupt and malicious motives. Scott v. Fishblate, 117 N. C. 265, 23 S. E. 436 (1895) ;
Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12, 29 Am. Rep.
80 (1878). This seems to be because of the
exclusiveness in such a case of the statutory
remedy of prosecution for a misdemeanor.
In other words, there is a public policy prohibitive of attacking the conduct of a public

course legitimately .

officer in private litigation.

. .

. But a private agree-

Iment of this sort between the owner and
bidder at a sale by auction would be a gross
fraud." See Peck v. List, 23 W. Va. 338,
48 Am. Rep. 398 (1883). The conclusion is,
therefore, that the contract, entered into in
secret between the plaintiff and defendant, is
invalid, because it contemplated a fraud upon
third persons. Blythe v. Lovinggood, 24 N.
C. 20, 37 Am. Dec. 402 (1841); Veasie v.
Williams, 8 How. (U. S.) 134 (1850). "In
the enforcement of such an agreement the
law would be the instrument of executing a
deceptive design." 31 Yale L. J. 434. While
the dictumn of the Court may be considered unfortunate, it does not operate to repeal the
definitely established policy against fictitious
bids at an auction.
F. B. McC.
LIABILITYrOF JUSTICE OF PEACE FOR NGLIGENT FAILURE TO DocKEr APPEAL.-A sued B

in a justice court and obtained a judgment.
B gave notice of an appeal to the Superior
Court, paid to the justice the appeal fee and
the fee for docketing the appeal in the Superior Court, and asked him to send up the
papers and docket fee to that Court. The
justice agreed to do so. Because of the negligent failure of the justice to send up the
papers and to docket the appeal and pay the
fee within the time allowed, A had the appeal dismissed. As a result, B was required
to satisfy the judgment. B then sued the justice of the peace in the County Court for damages in the sum of the amount paid A on the
judgmeit, alleging that he had had a meritorious'defense on a set-off to A's action. On
a verdict in B's favor, he obtained a judgment,
The justice appealed to the Superior Court,
where B was non-suited. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, held, non-suit sustained,
Simonds and Wife v. Carson, 182 N. C. 82,
108 S. E. 353 (1921).
By statute, a justice of the peace is made
guilty of a misdemeanor for wilful failure to

Moreover, and

for the same reasons, a justice of the peace,
when performing a judicial function within
his jurisdiction, is not liable for negligent misconduct in office. Lange v. Benedict, supra;
Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N. J. L. 654, 43 Am.
Rep. 412 (1882); Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga.
336, 32 S. E. 86 (1898) ; 44 L. R. A. (n. s.)
171, note. On the other hand, a justice of
the peace is civilly liable for negligent misconduct in office while acting in a purely ministerial capacity. Grove v. Van Duyn, supra;
Legates v. Lingo, 8 Houst. (Del.) 154, 32
Ati. 80 (1888). Similarly, when he is acting
even in a judicial capacity in a matter beyond his jurisdiction. Broom v. Douglass,
175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860 (1912).
Docketing an appeal in the Superior Court,
however, is not an official duty of a justice of
the peace. He is merely required to send the
papers up to the appellate court. It is the
duty of the appellant to see.that the case is
docketed in that court and the docket fee
paid. And for that purpose he is given the
statutory remedy of attachment. C. S. sec.
660, 1532. Thus the agreement of the justice
in the instant case to see that the case was
docketed in the Superior Court was merely a
personal accommodation. Apparently, however, the justice failed both to send up the papers and to docket the case. Irrespective,
therefore, of his liability for the second omission, the question is involved whether, under
the principles suggested above, he could be
liable for the failura to comply with his
statutory duty to send up the papers. The
Court thought that the act of sending up the
papers in an appealed case is a judicial act,
apparently because it is required of the justice
by statute. The Court recognized that the
same act on the part of the clerk of the Superior Court in sending a record to the Supreme Court, is a ministerial function, and
distinguished the principal case on the ground
that a justice has no clerk and must perform
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this duty himself. It is submitted that the
sending up of a record to a higher court is an
act devoid of any discretionary element and
is a ministerial function whether performed
by a court clerk or by a justice without a
clerk, and that the liability for negligence in
performing a ministerial act, indicated above,
should have attached in the instant case.
State v. Sneed, 84 N. C. 817, 824-825 (1881) ;
State v. Cressinger, 88 Ind. 499, 98 Am. St.
Rep. 893, note; 16 R. C. L. 347-348.
As to the second omission, namely, the negligent failure to carry out the assumed personal obligation to docket the case in the Superior Court, the Court thought that the justice could not be liable. The Court admitted
that an attorney engaged in the case who
failed in this regard, would be liable and that
the justice would be liable for an intentional
or fraudulent default, but distinguished the
instant case on the ground that no consideration was given for the justice's undertaking.
See Truelove v. Norris, 151 N. C. 757, 67 S.
E. 487 (1910). In other words, the feeling
was that an individual should not be made
liable for mere negligent non-feasance in
the performance of an assumed duty.
Was the plaintiff, however, in a position
to enforce any 'liability on the part of the
justice for negligent failure to perform even
a ministerial duty of sending up an appeal to
the Superior Court? The clear policy of the
North Carolina Court has been to regard it
as the duty of the appellant to see that his
appeal is carried through to completion, and
to regard him as responsible even for the failure of the justice to perform his statutory
duty to send up the appeal. Blair v. Coakley,
136 N. C. 40, 48 S. E. 804 (1904); Bargain
House v. Jefferson, 180 N. C. 32, 103 S. E.
922 (1920). Whatever, therefore, might be
the liability of the justice in such a case, the
appellant is contributorily negligent if he
actually neglects to see that the appeal is carried through, especially if he attempts to
abandon that responsibility by relying on the
gratuitous undertaking of the justice to take
charge of the matter. In the instant case,
the appeal was taken oh May 2 to a term of
the Superior Court beginning May 20, and no
attempt was made to docket the case in that
Court until July 3.
W. A. G.
ESTOPPEL BY DFnn--EFFEcT OF REGISTRATION

land to another, who promptly registered the
mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, Mrs. S.,
one of the original mortgagors, repurchased
the land and conveyed it to plaintiff, who
immediately registered the deed. Defendant
had not yet placed his deed upon record.
Held, the title acquired by the repurchase did
not inure by way of estoppel to the defendant's benefit. Builders' Sash and Door Co.
v. Joyner, 109 S. E. 259 (N. C. 1921).
It is a well settled rule that when a conveyance is made with covenants of warranty
by one who later gets in the title, the after
acquired title inures by estoppel to the benefit
of the grantee. See 17 Harv. Law Rev. 482;
Van Renslaer v. Kearney, 52 U. S. 297
(1850) ; Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N. C. 947,
44 S. E. 655 (1903). If this estoppel actually
passes title to the original grantee at common
law, later purchasers would be without remedy. If it merely creates an equity against
the grantor, subsequent purchasers for value
and without notice should be protected. See
17 Harv. Law Rev. 482. Under our registration acts, however, a satisfactory result
may be obtained regardless of the view
adopted. The purpose of these statutes seems
to be that of facilitating transfers of title
to property by making it safe to deal with the
owners of the record title. Consequently,
they deprive the grantee under an earlier unregistered conveyance, of the common law
right which his priority of execution would
naturally give him over a subsequent grantee.
For the later grantee could have no notice
from the record of the previous conveyance.
See 17 Harv. Law Rev. 482. By virtue of
the registration acts, the prior registry prevails as against a title by estoppel except as
to a purchaser with notice. Ford v. Unity
Church Society, 120 Mo. 498, 25 S. W. 394,
23 L. R. A. 561, and note (1894). Where
there is no record of the conveyance, there can
be no constructive notice. Under the North
Carolina registry act, it has been consistently
held that no notice, however full and formal,
will supply the place of registration. Fertilizer Co. v. Lane, 173 N. C. 184, 91 S. E.
953 (1917); Dye v. Morrison, 181 N. C.
309, 107 S. E. 138 (1921). Since the registry
system is due to modern legislation, anything
in the common law inconsistent with it should
be considered abrogated. See 17 Harv. Law
Rev. 482.
W. T. S.

-S. and wife conveyed land to defendant.
Later, and before defendant placed his deed
on record, S. and wife mortgaged the same

NEw LIMITATIONS ON THE POLL TAx-A
school district was authorized by an act of
1920 to issue bonds, after a favorable vote
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of the people, and to levy a special tax upon
the property and the polls within the district
to meet the interest and to create a sinking
fund for the payment of the principal. On
January 1, 1921, the constitutional amendments of 1920 concerning the poll tax went
into effect. At an election in July, 1921, the
authorities of the district submitted to a favorable vote propositions for the bond issue
and for a special property tax. No proposition for a special poll tax was submitted.
Upon a taxpayer's action to restrain the
issuance of the bonds thus authorized, it was
objected that the district had not proceeded
pursuant to the statute, in that the required
poll tax had not been provided for. Held,
the bonds were properly authorized. Hammond v. McRae, 182 N. C. 747, 110 S. E.

102 (1921).
Art. V, sec. 1 of the North Carolina Constitution of 1868 required the legislature to
levy a *poll tax equal to the tax on property
valued at three hundred dollars, and provided
that the state and county poll tax combined
should not exceed two dollars on the head.
Thus, the maximum of the combined state and
county tax on property could not exceed 66
2-3 cents on the $100.00. So. Ry. v. Cherokee
County, 177 N. C. 86, 97 S. E. 758 (1918).
Inasmuch, however, as Art. IX, sec. 3 of the
constitution made county commissioners subject to indictment for failure to maintain the
public schools for the prescribed period, and
as the maximum yield of the general poll tax
often failed to bring in enough to make this
possible, it was decided that this equation
need not be maintained in the case of schools.
That is to say, the Collie case, overruling,
in 1907, the Barksdale case of 1885, held that
when the proportion of the general poll tax
allowed by Art V, sec. 2 to be expended for
school purposes, was actually insufficient, a
special tax either on the property or polls,
or both, in excess of the equation was permissable. Barksdale v. Comrs., 93 N. C.
472, Collie v. Corers., 145 N. C. 172, 59 S. E.
44. Moreover, for a special purpose, and
with special legislative consent, it was recognized on the basis of Art. V, sec. 6 of the
Constitution of 1868, that there was practically
no limit to legislative discretion as to the
amount of a special poll tax. That section
provided that the taxes for county purposes
should never exceed the double of the state
tax, except for a special purpose and with
the special approval of the General Assembly.
Nor did the proportion between the expenditures out of the poll tax for the schools and

for the support of the poor, as fixed in Art.
V, sec. 2, apply to a special poll tax. Moose
v. Corers., 172 N. C. 419, 90 S. E. 441
(1916). As a result, the total of general and
special poll taxes sometimes ran as high as
$9 and $10 on the head, and "60 per cent. of
the taxes were paid by persons owning less
than $500 of property. In other words, the
result was that the small taxpayer, if he paid
the poll tax also, paid nearly double the
rate of the larger taxpayers." See Hollander,
State Taxation, 104, quoted in Smith v.
Corers., 182 N. C. 149, 108 S. E. 443 (1921).
To remedy this situation, Art. V, sec. 1
was amended, effective January 1, 1921, so as
to shift the burden of taxation from the person to his property. This was done by (1)
making the poll tax permissive instead of
compulsory, (2) destroying the equation between the property tax and the poll, (3)
authorizing the legislature to levy a maximum
poll tax of $2.00 for general state and county
purposes, (4) authorizing cities and towns to
levy a maximum poll tax of $1.00 for general
purposes, and by (5) prohibiting all other
poll taxes. This amendment, as was said in
the principal case, was self executing, and
automatically repealed, on January 1, 1921,
all legislation authorizing poll taxes on terms
inconsistent with its provisons, except in those
cases where poll taxes had been pledged for
the payment of existing debts. The court
recognized that these obligations could not be
impaired by constitutional amendment any
more than by statute. Broadfoot v. City of
Fayetteville, 124 N. C. 478, 32 S. E. 804
(1899); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595
(1878). And since the amendment does not
authorize them, but on the contrary expressly
prohibits all other poll taxes except those
levied by the legislature and cities and towns,
the court was compelled to decide that special
tax districts are without authority to levy
any poll tax at all. As a corollary of this
reorganization of the poll tax situation, it
should be noted that the requirement of Art.
VI, see. 4, of the original constitution, that a
person must have paid his poll tax to be
eligible to vote, has been eliminated.
R. M. M.
EFFECT OF MOTIVE ON DUTY OwED HOTEL
BOARDE's GUEST-Troy was registered at de-

fendant's hotel as a boarder. Upon Troy's
invitation, Jones entered the hotel with Troy,
for the purpose of playing cards for money
in Troy's room on the fourth floor. The elevator shaft, just off the lobby on the main
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floor, was located behind a stairway, in the
dark. Due to this fact, and to the further
facts that it was a cloudy day and that the
paint on the shaft was of a neutral color,
Jones was unable to see that the elevator carriage was not in place. As a matter of fact,
it was then at one of the upper floors. Believing that the carriage was in place on the
main floor, Jones stepped through the open
door in the shaft, and fell to the cement floor
in the basement below. In an action for personal injuries due to the alleged negligence of
the defendant in permitting the door to be
open when the elevator carriage was not in
place, defendant had judgment below. Upon
appeal, held, new trial granted for error in
instruction excluding jury's use of res ipsa
loquitur. Jones v. Bland, 182 N. C. 70, 108
S. E. 344, 16 A. L. R. 1383, and note (1921).
A registered boarder at a hotel, because his
presence inures to the financial benefit of the
owner, is an invitee in the law of torts, and
to him the proprietor owes a duty to use due
care to keep the premises in a safe condition.
Patrick v. Springs, 154 N. C. 270, 70 S. E. 395
(1911). The status of the boarder's guest,
however, is not so clear. Most courts regard
him as a mere licensee, to whom no duty is
owed save that of refraining from wilful or
wanton injury and that of using care to warn
him of unobservable defects in the condition
of the premises. Money v. Travelers Hotel
Co., 174 N. C. 508, L. R A. 1918 B, 493,
93 S. E. 964 (1917). This seems to be because of a feeling that the possibility of financial gain accruing to the owner as a result of
his presence is not sufficiently direct or probable. A better view would be to regard the
boarder's guest as an invitee, particularly
where he is to be entertained in the restaurant
or in other rooms in the hotel where an extra
charge is made. McCracken v. Meyers, 75
N. J.L. 935, 16 L. R. A. (n.s.) 290, 68 Atl.
805 (1908) ; Hotel Assn. v. Walters, 23 Neb.
280, 36 N. W. 561 (1888). And even where, as
in the principal case, the guest is to be entertained in the boarder's own room, without
extra compensation to the proprietor of the
hotel, his presence is not without potential
economic benefit to the owner. Moreover,
the relative ease and convenience with which
members of the public can be received on
business or for pleasure, tends to make living
at a hotel more popular and thus to promote
the hotel business. The basic assumption in
the principal case is in accord with this view.
In this connection, the Court said "such a one,
termed an invitee, is entitled to the duty of
ordinary care from the proprietor and his

employees." And even if the plaintiff were
thought to be a mere licensee, the opened door
in the obscured and darkened elevator shaft
with the carriage four stories above, would
probably be regarded by most courts as an unobservable defect in the condition of the
premises of which Jones should have been
warned by the defendant. Schmidt v. Michigan Mining Co., 159 Mich. 308, 123 N. W.
1122 (1909); Davis v. Trust Co., 127 Ky.
800, 106 S. W. 843 (1908).
There are two possibilities as to the effect
of Jones' motive in entering the hotel. One
is that his being engaged in an illegal act
operated, as does contributory negligence, to
bar recovery. This view is untenable for two
reasons. In the first place, the mere act of
entering a hotel, even for the purpose of
playing cards for money, is not a crime. And
in the second place, even if it were, the law
prohibitive of gambling was not designed to
furnish a standard of care to be observed in
entering elevators. As the Court said in the
principal case, in disposing of one of the contentions of counsel, "such unlawful purpose,
even if established, could in no legal sense be
considered as the proximate or contributing
cause of plaintiff's injury." The other possibility is that Jones' motive had a direct bearing upon his status as an invitee, licensee or
trespasser. Even though it were originally
contemplated that Troy, a registered guest
in the hotel, might entertain his friends and
business associates in the various parts of
the establishment, it could hardly be said that
that implied invitation or license was to extend
to persons brought onto the premises for a
purpose prohibited by positive law. Especially
would this be true where one who knowingly
permits gambling on his premises is by statute
made guilty of a misdemeanor. See C. S.
see. 4431. It would seem, therefore, that
Jones' status was that of a person entering
the hotel without the permission of the owner
-a mere trespasser. No facts appearing to
show any conduct upon the part of the proprietor that might be called wilful or wanton
infliction of injury, the judgment for defendant seems to hive been the correct result,
This was the view taken in the principal case.
No reason is perceived, however, for remanding the case for a new trial. The reasons
assigned by the Court were that by the instructions given, too great a burden of proof
as to the defendant's negligence was imposed
upon the plaintiff, and that the jury was precluded from using the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. That is to say, the Court felt that
the evidence as it stood warranted a finding of
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negligence in allowing the elevator door to
remain open while the carriage was out of
place, and that under the instructions of the
trial judge, the jury would have been compelled, in order to bring in a verdict for the
plaintiff, to find specifically either that the
elevator boy left the door open, or that the
proprietor knew it was open, or that the door
was open, for such a period of time that the
proprietor should have noticed its condition.
Assuming, however, that the instructions in
question were erroneous, how could the error
have been prejudicial to this plaintiff? If, as
the Court had already decided, he was a trespasser, and if, as the Court had found, there
was no evidence tending to show wilful or
wanton disregard of his safety, there was
no liability on the part of the defendant, for
there had been no breach of any duty owed
to the plaintiff. The question, therefore, as
to whether the defendant or his servant had
been negligent was immaterial. Nothing short
of a finding of wilful or wanton injury could
have aided the plaintiff.
G. T.
LIm=TATxoNs

ON

TRANSFERABILITY

OF

SHARES OF STocK-The charter of a small
corporation engaged in a local telephone business provided that "shares of stock in this
corporation shall not be transferred or sold
until said sale or transfer shall have been reported to the directors and approved by them."
Plaintiff purchased a number of shares of
stock and attempted to have them transferred
on the books of the company. Each share
recited the provision above quoted from the
charter. The directors, in good faith, refused to approve the sales to the plaintiff, but
offered to procure other purchasers, whose interests would be in harmony with the management. Upon mandamus to compel the
company to transfer the stock, held, relief denied. Wright v. Irdell Telephone Co., 182
N. C. 308, 108 S. E. 744 (1921).
A share of stock in a corporation represents a chose in action, an intangible personal
property right. C. S. sec. 1164; Cooper v.
Dismal Swamp Canal Co., 6 N. C. 195 (1812).
But "stock in a corporation is not merely
property. It also creates a personal relation
analogous otherwise than technically to a
partnership. . . . There seems to be no
greater objection to retaining the right of
choosing one's associates in a corporation
than in a firm." Holmes, C. J., in Barrett v.
King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N. E. 934 (1902).
And it is frequently desirable, particularly in
a small business, that the shareholders may

be able to protect themselves against the acquisition of a controlling amount of stock by
business rivals or other disturbers. In the
principal case, the restrictions were imposed
to prevent the imminent likelihood of attack
through this channel by a national telephone
company which, in a similar manner, had
acquired control of defendant's predecessor.
A statute authorizing restrictions on the
transfer of stock to be incorporated in the
charter and recited in the stock certificate,
has been held valid. This because it negatived any public policy prohibitive of such restrictions as improper restraints on alienation.
Longyear v. Hardiman, 219 Mass. 405, 106 N.
E. 1012 (1914); 28 Harv. Law Rev. 705.
When restrictions are imposed in the charter
either under such statutory authority or in
the absence of a countervailing public policy,
they form original incidents or conditions of
the shares, and, especially when recited in the
stock certificate, are binding upon all holders.
Casper v. Kalt-Zimnzers Mfg. Co., 159 Wis.
517, 149 N. W. 754 (1914); Clark, Corporations, 2nd ed., 393. A mere by-law, however,
may not validly contain such a restriction.
This is because so great an advantage
would be given to the majority of the shareholders as to amount to a power to impose a
general restraint upon alienation by the minority, without their consent. Morris v. Husjong Dyeing Mach. Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 256, 86
Atl. 1026 (1913); Sargent v. Franklin Insurance Co., 8 Pick. (Mass.) 90 (1829). But
the fact that the restriction appears in a bylaw is no objection if the share of stock is
actually taken on that basis. New England
Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E.
432 (1894) ; Farmers' Mercantile and Supply
Co. v. Lain, 146 Wis. 252, 131 N. W. 366
(1911). Moreover, a contract between, the
shareholders themselves or between them and
the corporation, to the effect that no share
will be sold without the approval of the company, is binding upon the parties thereto.
Fitziinmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 Atl.
488 (1903) ; Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N.
Y. 519, 43 N. .E. 57 (1896); 20 Harv. Law
Rev. 328. The restriction, however, must
be a reasonable one, and its exercise must be
free from caprice. Rice v. Rockefeller, 134
N. Y. 174, 31 N. E. 907 (1892) ; In re Copal
Varnish Co., Ltd., (1917) 2 Ch. 349; 31 Harv.
Law Rev. 654.
In North Carolina there is no statutory authority for imposing restrictions upon the
transferability of shares of stock. On the
other hand, there seems to be no public policy
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them. The principal case,
instance of a reasonable recontained in the corporate
exercised in good faith.
R. H. F.

ENFORCEMENT

OF

EIGHTEENTH

AMENDMENT-The defendant was convicted
of having liquor in his possession for the purpose of sale in violation of C. S. sec. 3379.
He appealed on the ground that the statute
was repealed by the Eighteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
The court sustained the conviction. State v.
Campbell, 182 N. C. 911, 110 S. E. 86 (1921).
The Eighteenth Amendment gives to Congress and to the several states "concurrent
power" to enforce its provisions by "appropriate legislation." Since this is the only place
in the Constitution where this identical expression is used in a similar connection, the
construction of this phrase has given rise to
a new problem. See 33 Harv. Law Rev. 968.
Does the Amendment 'mean that the joint
action of both Congress and the state legislatures is necessary to the enactment of enforcement provisions? Interpreting the word
"concurrent" as meaning "running together,
having joint and equal authority," the phrase
may mean that the laws of neither sovereign
are supreme over those of the other and
that the united action of state and nation
is necessary to the validity of any legislation
on the subject. See National Prohibition
Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 392, 407 (1919), dissenting opinions. Or, does the term "concurrent power," contemplate that each sover-

eignty may enact such legislation as is actually an enforcement of the Amendment? By
this theory the words are held to imply that
the power exists in both at the same time,
each being independent of the other. This
view is adopted by the courts. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1919) ; Powell
v.State, 90 So. 138 (Ala. 1921); Palmer v.
State, 133 N. E. 388 (Ind. 1921). But the
same authorities hold that, where there is a
conflict between the national and state laws
on this subject, the state laws must yield.
Each state may then make such laws as it
pleases within its jurisdiction so long as such
acts contemplate the enforcement of the
Amendment and are not inconsistent with the
existing federal statutes on the same subject.
Ex parte Volpi, 199 Pac. 1090 (Cal. 1921).
See 34 Harv. Law Rev. 317.
Thus all of the prohibition laws of North
Carolina, whether passed prior to or after the
adoption of the Amendment, if not in conflict with the federal enforcement provisions,
are to this extent valid. State v. Fore, 180
N. C. 744, 105 S .E. 334 (1920); State v.
Muse, 181 N. C. 506, 107 S. E. 320 (1921).
Moreover, one act may be a violation of the
laws of both sovereigns, state and nation.
See 19 Mich. Law Rev. 647. Therefore, a
conviction under the laws of one is not a
bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same
act under the laws of the other. That is to
say, such a proceeding does not constitute
double jeopardy. U. S.'v. Holt, 270 Fed. 639
(W. D., N. Dak. 1921); Bryson v. State,
108 S. E. 63 (Ga. 1921).
C. G.A.

